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Does the interest rate for business loans respond 
asymmetrically to changes in the cash rate? 
 
This article examines the dynamic relationship between the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 
(RBA) cash rate and the variable interest rate for lending to small businesses. The 
relationship is evaluated via an asymmetric GARCH model using monthly data 
spanning from August 1990 to October 2012. Our results show that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the cash rate results in an instantaneous 1.086 percentage point rise in the 
variable rate for small businesses, whereas an equivalent 1 percentage point cut only 
leads to a 0.862 percentage point fall with a delay of up to 2 months. This outcome has 
obvious implications for the RBA’s monetary policy transmission mechanism and the 
effectiveness of the expansionary versus contractionary policy.  
I.  Introduction 
We examine how dynamic changes in the RBA’s cash rate impact on variable lending 
rates for small business loans. Compared to large corporations, small businesses usually 
cannot raise funds through the issue of bonds or shares and are thus heavily reliant on 
lenders for capital formation. Without alternative avenues for raising funds it is of vital 
interest to small businesses to investigate if interest rates for this important sector of the 
economy “shoot up like rockets” in response to a rise in banks’ funding costs but “float 
down like feathers” in response to a fall.  
In Australia the RBA, which is the country’s central bank, conducts monetary 
policy by setting the desired interest rate on overnight loans in the money market. 
Through this monetary policy transmission mechanism, changes in the cash rate are 
ultimately reflected in the rates on all lending instruments. There are a growing number 
of studies which have found that banks tend to raise interest rates immediately once 
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costs rise, while hesitating to lower their rates when costs drop (see inter alia Payne, 
2007; Toolsema and Jacobs, 2007; Payne and Waters, 2008).  
Lowe and Rohling (1992) and Lowe (1995) investigated the degree of stickiness 
in Australia’s various deposit and lending rates by comparing them in the pre- (1979-
1985) and post- (1986-1991) deregulation periods. Lowe and Rohling (1992) argued 
that switching and search costs were the most critical reasons behind the stickiness of 
most lending rates in Australia. However, apart from these two early studies, the issue 
of the asymmetric behaviour of interest rates for businesses in Australia has not 
received much attention. This article intends to fill this gap by identifying the full extent 
of asymmetric rate changes (if any), with the aim of increasing transparency in the 
commercial lending market for small businesses. 
The rest of this article is organised as follows. A discussion of the theoretical 
framework for capturing lenders’ asymmetry pricing behaviour in response to changes 
in the cash rate is given in Section II. The descriptive statistics and the unit root test 
results for the monthly data are presented in Section III. Empirical findings are offered 
in Section IV, followed by concluding remarks in Section V. 
 
II.  Theoretical Framework 
Equation 1 allows us to examine whether short-run positive and negative changes in the 
cash rate, with different lags, can exert asymmetric impacts on the small business 
lending rate. At the same time it also enables us to capture any possible ARCH and 
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Lt = the interest rate for small business loans,  
0ξ = the intercept term in the mean equation,  




− = the short-run effects of positive and negative changes in the cash rate on Lt, 
GFC = a binary dummy variable accounting for the GFC and taking the value of unity 
after September 2008 when the Lehman Brothers collapsed, 
γ  = the effect of the GFC on borrowing cost,  
jη = the short-run effects of changes in the j
th-lagged dependent variable (j = 1, 2, … , 
12), 
αi and βj = the ARCH and GARCH coefficients in the variance equation. 














∑ . In other words, the higher the difference, the greater the extent of asymmetry. It 
is hypothesised that the RBA’s rate rises have immediate effects on the small business 
interest rate (only 
0λ
+ to be statistically significant), whereas in the case of rate cuts the 
lagged effects are exhausted over a longer period (
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can be significant). 
Hence, the short-run effects of changes in R on the business loan rate can vary both in 
magnitude and through time. Once Equations 1 and 2 are estimated by a maximum 
likelihood method, we can then use a Wald test to formally test the possibility of 





III.  Data 
The data utilised in this article was collected directly from the RBA (2012, Tables D2, 
F1 and F5). It has been established elsewhere that the use of aggregated frequencies 
(i.e., annual and quarterly) may obscure underlying asymmetries in a series (Brännäs 
and Ohlsson, 1999). Thus we used monthly observations from August 1990 to October 
2012 in order to undertake our econometric analysis. 
Figs 1 and 2 show how total credit and loans were distributed for various uses by 
all bank and non-bank financial institutions from 1990 to 2012. As can be seen from 
Fig. 1 unlike the other four categories (owner-occupier housing; investor housing; other 
personal; government), business (small and large combined) loans suffered a noticeable 
decline over the post 2008 GFC era, only just recovering in the last 12 months. 
Similarly, Fig. 2 reveals that the percentage share of business loans in total credit 
(including securitisation) has consistently been on a downward trajectory since 1990. 
This share declined from 57% in 1990 to 32% in 2012. It is therefore apparent that 
lenders have changed preference away from credit and loans for businesses and toward 
owner-occupier housing and investor housing loans. 
[FIGS 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Fig. 3 shows the difference (spread) between the cash rate and five different 
variable lending rates for small businesses: residential-secured term; residential-secured 
term overdraft; other term; other overdraft; small overdraft. Monthly data were available 
for only two spread measures (i.e. other overdraft; small overdraft) from August 1990 to 
October 2012. Thus in this article we chose the variable interest rate on small overdraft 
(L) as a measure of lending costs for small businesses.  
Irrespective of which measure of spread is considered, the gap between all lending 
rates for small businesses and the cash rate has widened considerably in the post 2008 
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GFC era, coinciding with a time where the cash rate has fallen dramatically. In 
comparison, during the period March 2002 to April 2008 when the cash rate rose from 
4.3% to 7.2% all our measures of spread remained unchanged (See Fig. 3). One could 
attribute such a widening gap in recent times to either the rising funding cost or lenders’ 
asymmetric behaviour in response to the RBA’s rate cuts.    
[FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and the DF unit root test with GLS 
Detrending (Elliott et al., 1996) for the cash rate and interest rate for small business. 
During the sample period, the average overdraft rate for small business (as a dependent 
variable) was 10.2%, ranging from a minimum of 8.3% in January 1999 to a maximum 
of 17.6% in August 1990. The SD for the dependent variable (1.6%) is slightly less than 
the cash rate (1.9%). Table 1 also shows that the first differences of both interest rate 
series are stationary.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
We use monthly data for the period August 1990 to October 2012 to estimate an 
asymmetric relationship between positive and negative changes in the cash rate (Rt) and 
the small business loan rate (Lt). Equations 1 and 2 are jointly estimated using the 
maximum likelihood method and results are presented in Table 2. We have used the 
lowest value of the Schwarz criterion to determine the optimal lag length and the 
number of the ARCH and GARCH terms. Table 2 indicates that all the estimated 
coefficients in the mean and variance equations are statistically significant at the 1% 
level with the expected theoretical signs. The estimated model also shows no sign of 
ARCH effects and heteroskedasticity. Table 3 presents the correlograms of the 
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estimated standardised residuals squared showing that the Q-Stats up to 24 lags are all 
statistically insignificant. One can thus argue that our GARCH (1, 1) model is adequate 
in capturing the volatility clustering. 
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 shows that if the RBA increases the cash rate by 1 percentage point, the 
business loan rate (proxied by the small business variable overdraft rate) would 
instantaneously (at time t) increase by 1.086 percentage points with no further 
subsequent responses over time. However, a 1 percentage point fall in the cash rate 
would bring about an instantaneous 0.620 percentage point decrease at time t in addition 
to a subsequent one month lagged effect of 0.242 percentage points, with the total 
effects at times t and t-1 thus being 0.862 (=0.620+0.242). Finally, the GFC coefficient 
ˆ 0.021γ =  is also highly significant, confirming that that the cost of borrowing for small 
businesses has risen since 2008.  
We have formally tested 
0 0 10 :H λ λ λ
+ − −= + versos 
0 0 11 :H λ λ λ
+ − −+> and present 
these results at the bottom of Table 2. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level of 
significance. This means that small business lending rate do indeed respond 
asymmetrically to positive versus negative changes in the cash rate. Clearly stated, rate 
cuts are confirmed to be passed onto the customer much slower than rate rises. Since it 
takes longer for lenders to partially pass the rate cuts to small businesses, one may argue 
that this can adversely affect the efficacy of the RBA’s expansionary monetary policy. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
This article traces out the lenders’ dynamic asymmetric responses to changes in the 
funding cost over time using monthly data (August 1990-October 2012). We found that 
the lending rate for small businesses rises more quickly than it falls in response to 
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changes in the RBA’s cash rate. In other words, in contrast to cash rate increases which 
are passed on immediately and with a premium, when the RBA cuts its cash rate the 
banks only partially pass on the cut with a month delay. We also found that funding 
costs for small business have increased significantly since the GFC. These findings have 
obvious adverse effects for small business capital formation and loan servicing in an 
important recovery phase of the economy as well as broader implications for the 
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Source: RBA (2012, Table D2).  
 






Source: The authors’ computations based on RBA (2012, Table D2).  
 













































































































































































Source: The authors’ computations based on RBA (2012, Tables F1 and F5).  
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics and unit root test results (Aug. 1990-Oct. 
2012) 
Description Unit  Mean Max. Min. SD 
Small business variable overdraft rate=Lt % 10.2 17.6 8.3 1.6 
RBA's cash rate=Rt % 5.8 14.0 3.0 1.9 
 DF GLS test Lt  ∆Lt  Rt ∆Rt    
    t-stat. -0.706 -4.251*** -1.296 -6.018***   
    Optimal lag 2 1 2 1   
Source: RBA (2012, Tables D2, F1 and F5) 
 







Table 2.  Estimated short-run dynamic model 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
t t t t t t t
L R R R GFC L Lξ λ λ λ γ η η
+ + − − − −
− −
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆+  











































R  0.728  
2
R  0.721  
Schwarz criterion -2.340  
DW 2.30  
Jarque-Bera ***(2) 758.5χ =   
ARCH test:   
1 lag F(1,261)=0.773  
2 lags F(2,259)=0.587  
3 lags F(3,257)=1.079  
4 lags F(4,255)=0.804  
5 lags F(5,253)=0.639  
6 lags F(6,251)=0.662  
Testing for the asymmetry effects  
0 0 10
:H λ λ λ
+ − −
= +  
0 0 11





*** indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is 







Table 3.  Correlograms of standardised residuals  
Lags 






1 0.054 0.054 0.788 0.375 
2 0.042 0.039 1.269 0.530 
3 0.093 0.089 3.598 0.308 
4 0.006 -0.005 3.608 0.462 
5 0.002 -0.006 3.609 0.607 
6 -0.048 -0.056 4.223 0.647 
7 -0.039 -0.035 4.646 0.703 
8 -0.016 -0.008 4.716 0.787 
9 -0.015 -0.002 4.781 0.853 
10 0.101 0.112 7.595 0.668 
11 0.028 0.022 7.819 0.729 
12 -0.001 -0.012 7.819 0.799 
13 0.060 0.035 8.812 0.787 
14 0.063 0.051 9.915 0.768 
15 0.016 0.006 9.983 0.821 
16 0.011 0.007 10.017 0.866 
17 -0.018 -0.021 10.110 0.899 
18 -0.033 -0.031 10.416 0.917 
19 -0.009 0.001 10.437 0.941 
20 -0.018 -0.014 10.534 0.957 
21 -0.056 -0.048 11.431 0.954 
22 -0.066 -0.056 12.685 0.942 
23 -0.040 -0.038 13.149 0.949 
24 0.271 0.282 34.568 0.075 
Note: These results are based on the estimated model 
presented in Table 2.  
 
